1) determining what indexes of performance require measurement, 2) developing adequate tools to sample these indexes, and 3) deciding at what times to collect the measurement samples.
Numerous investigators have addressed these problem areas, but there has been no consensus about exactly what the solutions should be. However, one rather widely used approach has been to establish a specific set of flight maneuvers, determine (through expert consensus) the relevant parameters, and measure the pilot's ability to maintain these parameters using objective and/or subjective evaluations.
Dellinger, Taylor, and Richardson (1986) compared the effects of atropine and ethanol on the simulator performance of pilots using a computerized measurement system. The subject pilots were required to fly instrument holding patterns and complete an instrument landing system (ILS) approach while the computer measured such variables as altitude control, turn rate, and localizer tracking. Root mean square (RMS), errors were calculated on each of the variables for each pilot in order to determine the amount of control deviation from specified standards, and analysis of these RWS errors permitted evaluation of drug effects. 
Simmons et al. (1989) used

Safety nilot evaluations
In addition to the computerized scoring system, a safety pilot rated the performance of each subject on each maneuver using a special rating form.
There was a separate sheet for each maneuver on which the flight parameters for the specific maneuver could be evaluated in terms of how well the subject remained within prescribed limits (see Appendix B Each subject received all three injections according to a randomly assigned, counter-balanced dose-administration order in which the six orders were represented among both the first and second set of aviator participants (to permit a balanced preliminary analysis). Neither the subjects nor the researchers, with the exception of the principal investigator, were aware of which dose-administration sequence was used.
Each dose-administration (or test) day consisted of two helicopter flights interspersed with laboratory testing (described elsewhere).
The drug (or placebo) injection was given immediately prior to the first flight of the day. There was no injection given prior to the second flight of the day which occurred approximately 5.5 hours postdose. Each flight was approximately 2 hours in length, and the sequence of maneuvers in each flight was held constant (see Table 1 ).
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The control days which followed each dose-administration day were used primarily to ensure all atropine effects had subsided prior to the next dose.
On these days, two complete in-house testing sessions were administered, but no atropine was given and no in-flight testing was conducted. The grades consisted of scores ranging from 1 to 5, each associated with a particular level of flight performance accuracy (performance band). The bands were established around the ATM standards for each maneuver with a score of 3 being the standard for the performance measure in that maneuver.
Scores higher than 3 represented performance which exceeded the minimum acceptable performance level and those below 3 represented substandard performance.
In addition to these safety-pilot grades, each subject's flight performance also was evaluated with the onboard computerized monitoring system described earlier.
Each subject began by flying a series of upper-air maneuvers sharing some commonality with more complex helicopter maneuvering tasks such as air-to-air combat, low-level flight, and nap-ofthe-earth (NOE) flight. The aviators then moved on to the next portion of the flight profile, which simulated a common tactical mission of ingress into a forward battle position, and this was followed by a segment in which subjects navigated low-level and nap-of-the-earth courses. The final phase of the profile tested the pilot's ability to operate the aircraft after the majority of his visual cues were removed.
While at NOE altitude, the subject was instructed to affix a hood to his helmet which restricted his view of the earth and forced him to fly using only the flight instruments.
He then was directed to perform an immediate climb to altitude to simulate inadvertent flight into low-lying clouds after which he flew the last straight-and-level segment. The profile ended with a precision ILS approach to landing. All maneuvers within the profile were flown in the same order across all trials.
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Initial data processing
The flight performance data was processed differently depending upon whether it was computer-based or safety-pilot generated.
Although in most cases, both the computer and the safety pilot scored the same measure (heading, airspeed, etc.), the safety-pilot grades were in final form at the conclusion of each flight whereas the computer data required additional processing.
For the computer data, once all the raw flight performance data were collected, each measure (heading, airspeed, altitude, etc.) was scored within each maneuver to yield two types of outcome measures. Subsequent examination of the data revealed that the reason for at least one of the nonsignificant findings was due to the lack of congruence between the RMS and percent values for 2 of the 12 subjects.
Here, the roll measure was examined from the 10 morning flight of the 2-mg dose day, and it was found that the 2 subjects had virtually identical RWS errors, but had percent scores which differed by 25 points.
The explanation for such a phenomenon resides in the method of calculation for the two types of computer scores.
With the percent scores, samples are classified into discrete bands, one of which is scored as a 0. Once a subject exceeds a certain magnitude of control deviation, he receives a 0 whether he makes an error which slightly exceeds the critical value, or whether he makes an error which greatly exceeds the value.
With the RWS errors, the amount of deviation is squared regardless of how large or small that deviation may be.
Thus, a few very large control errors would significantly inflate the RMS error values whereas it would have a small effect on the percent scores.
RMS errors are typically transformed into log naturals prior to analysis in order to minimize the inflation attributable to extreme values: however, this step was omitted when analyzing data for the purposes of this report.
The fact that the scores on roll control often were affected most by the problem outlined above was probably a function of 1 individual differences in technique for controlling roll in turns.
Also, aircraft roll is somewhat more difficult to stabilize than are other aspects of flight (such as airspeed and altitude).
Besides the discrepancies related to the roll measure, there was another instance in which the correlation coefficient was 0.0 because there was no variability in the RMS errors for that measure on one particular maneuver. This was because RMS errors were written to a data file with only two digits to the right of the decimal point, and slip fluctuations in this case were simply too small to be accurately reflected given that level of precision.
However, it should be noted, with the exception of these few instances, there was most often an extremely high level of agreement between the two computerized assessments of flight performance.
This agrees with earlier assessments of these data, in which analysis of variance was performed on both types (RMS and percent), and the results were strikingly similar.
Relationship between RMS and safety-pilot grades
More central to the purpose of this report is the comparison between computer scoring of performance and safety-pilot evaluations.
In the most global sense, it could be seen that out of the 342 correlations between RMS errors and safety-pilot grades, there were 171 which 'fhus, there was a reasonably and safety-pilot evaluations .,$t?asures. 
